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WAITING FOR DAUBER T:
THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT AND THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Brian Irvine*
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court set forth a new rule for the
admissibility of expert testimony in federal courts.1 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Court overturned the seventy-year-old "general
acceptance" test, which had allowed federal courts to certify witnesses as
experts only when their testimony consisted of theories, opinions, or conclu-
sions that had been generally accepted by the scientific community.' The
Court in Daubert held that the general acceptance test established in Frye v.
United States had been superceded by the more liberal Federal Rule of Evi-
dence (hereinafter FRE) 702.' Under the Daubert Court's interpretation of
FRE 702, federal judges now must examine the scientific validity of the meth-
odology used to form expert opinions or conclusions before admitting
testimony.4
Prior to the FRE and the Daubert decision, most states had applied the
Frye test for general scientific acceptance. Since the FRE were adopted,
almost every state, including Nevada, has adopted a provision nearly identical
to FRE 702 to govern the admissibility of scientific evidence.5 Only a few
states have continued to apply the Frye general acceptance test; most states
have since expressly adopted the Daubert decision or have interpreted and
applied rules like FRE 702 in a similar fashion.6
Unfortunately, the Nevada rule for the admission of expert testimony
remains unclear. The Nevada Supreme Court has sometimes used general
acceptance as the deciding factor in determining admissibility,7 yet has ada-
mantly refused to adopt Frye.8 The court has likewise refused to adopt
Daubert, stating:
* Brian Irvine is a clerk for Judge Melvin Brunetti, United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. J.D., 2001, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
' See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579; FED. R. EvID. 702.
4 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
5 See Heather G. Hamilton, The Movement from Frye to Daubert: Where Do the States
Stand?, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 210 (1998) (listing Connecticut, Maine, New York, and
Pennsylvania as the only states with no provision similar to FRE 702).
6 See id.
7 See, e.g., Am. Elevator Co. v. Briscoe, 572 P.2d 534, 538 (Nev. 1977).
8 See Santillanes v. State, 765 P.2d 1147, 1150 n.3 (Nev. 1988) ("In the sixty-five years
since Frye was decided we have neither cited to nor adopted the decision.").
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We believe that the Daubert doctrine is a work in progress, and that we should
observe the doctrine's further development in the federal courts before concluding
that Daubert should be adopted as the law of this state. Above all, we do not pres-
ently perceive a need to adopt Daubert, based on our perception of developments in
Nevada law, and we therefore decline to do so.
9
The admission of expert testimony in Nevada state courts is "left to the
sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal in the
absence of showing such discretion was abused.""0 Experts need not be
licensed in their area of expertise in order to be qualified, but the lack of a
license, in conjunction with other factors, may preclude qualification as an
expert." The issue for the court to examine is not one of licensure, but rather
the witness' actual knowledge, and whether she possesses special knowledge,
training, and education in the area. 2 If the trial court decides that the witness
has such knowledge or training, and that the testimony will assist the trier of
fact to understand a contested issue, then the testimony should be admitted,13
so long as it meets standards of "reliability and trustworthiness." 14
The most recent trend in Nevada is to examine reliability and trustworthi-
ness in terms of the expert's credentials while ignoring the methods by which
the expert's conclusions were reached. I" This trend is troubling in that an
expert with good standing in his field might offer conclusions that have not yet
been considered by his peers. The "credentials" method can allow the expert to
offer opinions that are subsequently proven to be untenable. This result places
an undue burden on the cross-examining attorney to cast doubt upon the opin-
ions of a witness with impeccable credentials. Additionally, the adversary sys-
tem compels lawyers to find experts to refute the testimony offered by their
opponent. The Nevada rule results in unqualified lay-juries being forced to
determine which party's expert witness provides the more valid opinion, under-
mining the purpose for which expert testimony is used. A preferable method
would be for the court to not only scrutinize the expert's credentials at the
outset, but also to consider equally the opinions that the expert will offer at trial
and to examine the methodology behind those opinions.
The Nevada Supreme Court has not provided guidelines for trial courts to
use in determining whether the witness has special knowledge or training. It
has also failed to seriously examine the methodology behind expert opinions in
recent cases.16 Trial courts, in turn, have used inconsistent reasoning in decid-
ing to admit or exclude expert testimony, basing their decisions on a variety of
factors, including general acceptance, 7 the experts' credentials,18 or licensure
9 Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 108 n.3 (Nev. 1998).
10 Provence v. Cunningham, 588 P.2d 1020, 1021 (Nev. 1979).
11 See Cheyenne v. Hozz, 720 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Nev. 1986); Wright v. Las Vegas Hacienda,
720 P.2d 696, 697 (Nev. 1986).
12 See Wright, 720 P.2d at 697; Freeman v. Davidson, 768 P.2d 885, 886 (Nev. 1989).
"3 See Wright, 720 P.2d at 697; Fernandez v. Admirand, 843 P.2d 354, 358-59 (Nev. 1992).
14 Nev. Employment Sec. Dept. v. Holmes, 914 P.2d 611, 615 (Nev. 1996).
15 See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 108-09 (Nev. 1998); Yamaha Motor
Co., U.S.A. v. Arnoult, 955 P.2d 661, 667-68 (Nev. 1998).
16 See, e.g., Dow Chem., 970 P.2d at 108-09; Yamaha, 955 P.2d at 667-68.
17 See Am. Elevator Co. v. Briscoe, 572 P.2d 534, 538 (Nev. 1977).
18 See Dow Chem., 970 P.2d at 108-09; Yamaha, 955 P.2d at 667-68.
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in the field of testimony. 9 This inconsistency has led to confusion and uncer-
tainty for Nevada practitioners, who cannot know what to expect when attempt-
ing to certify an expert for trial. Also, if an expert's credentials continue to be a
dispositive factor for .admissibility, juries may render judgments based on cut-
ting edge expert opinions that are reached carelessly or have not yet been con-
sidered by the scientific community. Until the Nevada Supreme Court adopts
Daubert or creates its own specific guidelines for trial courts to follow, confu-
sion and uncertainty will undoubtedly continue.
The contrast between the application of Nevada's rule for admitting expert
testimony and the application of the Daubert rule becomes clear when compar-
ing recent cases. Recent Nevada state cases provide only limited analysis of
experts' methodology, instead preferring to examine the experts' credentials.2°
On the other hand, recent cases of the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Nevada examine not only the experts' credentials, but also scrutinize the
methodology behind the experts' opinions to ensure that acceptable scientific
procedures were used.2 The federal decisions apply distinct factors and pro-
vide extensive analysis. 22 Consequently, the federal opinions provide clear
guidance as to what level of reliability the court will require before admitting
testimony.
This Note proposes that the Nevada Supreme Court should adopt Daubert,
so that Nevada state court practitioners would enjoy the same certainty and
predictability when constructing their cases and choosing expert witnesses.
Also, litigants in Nevada state courts would be protected from their opponents'
witnesses offering unreliable scientific opinions. Only when Nevada litigants
can expect the same degrees of predictability and reliability from state courts,
as from federal courts, will the incentive for forum shopping be removed.
Part I of this Note will examine the history of evidentiary rules pertaining
to expert testimony from Frye to the drafting of the FRE. Part II will continue
the historical examination from the FRE to the Daubert and Kumho Tire23
decisions. Part III will discuss the current Nevada statutes and case law gov-
erning the admissibility of expert testimony, consider the Nevada Supreme
Court's treatment of the Daubert rule, and analyze how certain evidentiary
issues in recent Nevada cases may have been resolved differently if the court
had applied the Daubert rule. Finally, Part IV will explore several recent deci-
sions of the United States District Court, District of Nevada in order to show
the federal court's exhaustive examination of scientific methodology under the
Daubert rule, as compared with the more cursory analysis conducted in state
court.
19 See Cheyenne v. Hozz, 720 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Nev. 1986).
20 See, e.g., Dow Chem., 970 P.2d 98; Yamaha, 955 P.2d 661.
21 See, e.g., Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 945 F. Supp. 209 (D. Nev. 1996); Valentine v. Pioneer
Chlor Alkali Co., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 666 (D. Nev. 1996).
22 See, e.g., Cabrera, 945 F. Supp. 209; Valentine, 921 F. Supp. 666.
23 See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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I. FRYE To FRE 702
In Frye v. United States, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia decided that all expert testimony must be comprised of ideas or con-
clusions "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the par-
ticular field in which it belongs."24 The decision was made in an attempt to
resolve many years of conflict surrounding the issue;25 however, the rule was
the subject of serious criticism from twentieth-century scholars. 2 6 As science
rapidly grew and new fields were introduced, courts began to realize that the
general acceptance test sometimes allowed for the admission of invalid science,
while excluding new but valid ideas or theories. 27 Dissatisfaction with the gen-
eral acceptance rule reached a new high in the federal system in 1975 with the
adoption of the FRE, which are generally slanted toward liberal admissibility of
evidence.28 FRE 702, "Testimony by Experts," provides that:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
29
Since the adoption of the FRE, nearly every state has adopted provisions
similar to FRE 702.
II. FRE 702 TO KuMHo TimE
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court examined FRE 702 in light of
the general acceptance test and determined that the two were incompatible. In
Daubert, the Court held that a trial judge must determine whether proposed
scientific evidence is relevant, pursuant to FRE 401, and that its possible preju-
dicial effects, pursuant to FRE 403, do not substantially outweigh its probative
value. 30 The judge must also determine whether the testimony constitutes the
expert's "genuine knowledge," and whether the testimony is reliable. 3 ' In
order to be considered reliable, testimony need not be "known to a certainty,"
32
but instead must at least consist of a body of known facts or of ideas supported
by appropriate validation or good scientific grounds. 33 The Court provided a
non-exhaustive list of factors for trial judges to consider in determining
24 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
25 See Lee Loevinger, Science as Evidence, 35 JuIuMETRmcs J. 153 (1995) (historical survey
of scientific evidence).
26 See, e.g., CHARLES T. MCCoRMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 325, at 692 (1954);
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET BERGER, 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 702[03], at 702-18,
702-19 (1987).
27 See Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for
Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 735 (1994).
28 See Richard D. Friedman, The Death and Transfiguration of Frye, 34 JuRimETRICs J.
133, 144-45 (1994).
29 FED. R. EvID. 702.
30 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
31 Id. at 587, 595; see also FED. R. EVID. 401, 403.
32 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
33 See id. at 590.
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whether the purported knowledge is based on good grounds.34 The trial court
should examine the proposed theory or scientific technique and consider: (1)
whether it can be tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) whether there is a known or potential rate of error; and (4)
whether it has been generally accepted. 35 None of these factors were disposi-
tive, but were instead intended to provide trial judges with some guidance,
while maintaining the flexibility envisioned by FRE 702.36
Daubert discussed scientific evidence, but was silent as to the ruling's
applicability to technical or other forms of specialized testimony,37 leaving the
issue to be resolved by Kumho Tire.3 8 In Kumho Tire, the Court held that
Daubert's requirement that the expert have genuine knowledge applied to all
types of experts. 39 The Court also found that there might be circumstances in
which the trial judge could legitimately apply the "gatekeeping" factors found
in Daubert.4 ° In deciding Kumho Tire, the Court stressed the difficulty of
drawing strict lines between scientific and technical testimony, concluding that
in most cases such a determination is unnecessary. 4 '
III. NRS § 50.275 AND NEVADA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The Nevada Revised Statutes (hereinafter NRS) include a provision nearly
identical to FRE 702. NRS § 50.275 provides that:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify to
matters within the scope of such knowledge.
42
From the time of Nevada's adoption of NRS § 50.275 in 1971 to the
Daubert decision in 1994, the Nevada Supreme Court has fashioned a different
interpretation from that of the federal courts. Nevada never expressly adopted
the federal courts' Frye test. Instead, the Nevada Supreme Court has remained
relatively independent from the influence of federal jurisprudence and has
developed its own rule for admitting expert testimony through a succession of
cases. The rule has evolved in a way that could make trial preparation difficult
for both plaintiff and defense counsel.
34 See id.
35 See id. at 593-94.
36 See id.
31 See id. at 594 n.12.
38 See id. at 590 n.8 ("Our discussion is limited to the scientific context because that is the
nature of the expertise offered here.").
39 See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
40 See id. at 151 ("In certain cases, it will be appropriate for the trial judge to ask, for
example, how often an engineering expert's experience-based methodology has produced
erroneous results, or whether such a method is generally accepted in the relevant engineering
community.").
41 See id. at 148.
42 NEV. REV. STAT. 50.275 was adopted from Draft Federal Rule 7-02. See Subcommittee's
Comment, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 50.275 (Michie 1971).
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The Nevada Supreme Court has established that specific types of science
are inadmissible, such as polygraph tests or narco-interrogation results. 4 3 How-
ever, the court has also decided that other science is reliable and admissible,
such as hair drug test results." As a result, the court has failed to provide a
coherent test for trial courts to use to evaluate new science. Instead, a looser
rule has been developed, granting trial courts broad discretion. The Nevada
Supreme Court will not disturb this rule unless such discretion has been
abused,4 5 or in more recent cases, unless the trial court's decision is "mani-
festly wrong."4 6
Development of the Nevada Rule
Shortly after Nevada adopted NRS § 50.275, the Nevada Supreme Court
held that the conditions of an out-of-court experiment attempting to prove the
trajectory of a fired bullet through re-creation must be "substantially similar" to
those at the time of the incident in order to be admissible.47 The court also held
that expert opinion testimony must not be admitted if it is shown to rest on
assumptions rather than facts.4 8
The threshold test for admitting expert opinion testimony is whether the
expert's specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand evi-
dence or ascertain the truth of relevant matters outside the knowledge of the
layperson.4 9 If the trial court concludes that the evidence would be helpful, it
must determine that the evidence is more probative than prejudicial.5° Finally,
the court has applied a two-pronged test, holding that evidence that has not
received court recognition as possessing "trustworthiness and reliability" can-
not be given the status of competent evidence. 5 ' The two-pronged test is some-
what vague, as trustworthiness and reliability are both highly subjective
determinations. Nonetheless, it is a test that provides trial courts with some
guidance.
Despite the fact that the court has often emphasized the importance of the
two-pronged test,52 it has sometimes failed to apply or even mention the test.
For example, the court did not seem to apply the two-pronged test in American
13 See Warden, Nev. State Prison v. Lischko, 523 P.2d 6, 8 (Nev. 1974); Am. Elevator Co.
v. Briscoe, 572 P.2d 534, 538 (Nev. 1977).
4 See Nev. Employment Sec. Dept. v. Holmes, 914 P.2d 611, 615 (Nev. 1996).
45 See Provence v. Cunningham, 588 P.2d 1020, 1021 (Nev. 1979); Wright v. Las Vegas
Hacienda, 720 P.2d 696, 697 (Nev. 1986).
46 Bolin v. State, 960 P.2d 784, 799 (Nev. 1998) (citing Petrocelli v. State, 692 P.2d 503,
508 (Nev. 1985)).
47 Wrenn v. State, 506 P.2d 418, 419-20 (Nev. 1973) (the experts conceded that the validity
of their calculations rested upon several assumed facts and that even a slight difference could
materially affect their conclusion).
48 See id. at 419.
49 See Townsend v. State, 734 P.2d 705, 708 (Nev. 1987); Yamaha Motor Co., U.S.A. v.
Arnoult, 955 P.2d 661, 667 (Nev. 1998).
50 See NEV. REV. STAT. 48.035, 50.275 (Michie 1971).
51 Warden, Nev. State Prison v. Lischko, 523 P.2d 6, 8 (Nev. 1974) (holding that a con-
victed defendant could not seek to introduce lie detector test and narco-interrogation results
on appeal because such tests had not received court recognition as possessing trustworthiness
and reliability).
52 See id.; Bolin v. State, 960 P.2d 784, 800 (Nev. 1998).
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Elevator Co. v. Briscoe,53 holding that the results of polygraph tests could not
be admitted under NRS § 50.275 because they had not received general scien-
tific acceptance.54 While the court seems to have applied the Frye test in
American Elevator, it clarified in a 1988 decision that it had not previously
cited to or adopted Frye.5 5 Instead, the court reaffirmed its intention to evalu-
ate evidence in terms of trustworthiness and reliability. 56
American Elevator is not the only case in which the court decided to
exclude or admit expert testimony without using the two-pronged test. Instead,
the court has admitted expert evidence based solely on its findings that the
testimony would assist the jury.57 In Watson v. State, the court relied on a jury
instruction allowing the jury to attach whatever credibility it wished to the
expert's testimony to protect the defendant from being harmed by the prejudi-
cial effect of the testimony, rather than determining its trustworthiness and reli-
ability at the outset.5 8 In another case, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the
admission of the testimony of an accident reconstruction expert, even though
his conclusions were based upon the factual findings of others.5 9 Additionally,
the court has consistently refused to exclude testimony based solely on the fact
that experts are not licensed in the field in which they will offer testimony. 60
The issue is not one of licensure, but rather of the witness's actual knowledge,
and whether she possesses special knowledge, training, and education in the
area.
61
The court has not always been so liberal in admitting testimony, and also
has excluded witnesses without discussing the two-pronged test. The court has
held that, although the lack of a license in the relevant field does not automati-
cally exclude an expert's testimony, a court may consider the witness's lack of
11 See Am. Elevator Co. v. Briscoe, 572 P.2d 534, 538 (Nev. 1977).
54 See id.
55 See Santillanes v. State, 765 P.2d 1147, 1150 n.3 (Nev. 1988).
56 See id. at 1150.
57 See, e.g., Watson v. State, 578 P.2d 753, 756 (Nev. 1978) (holding that the testimony
would have been helpful to the jury in order to indicate the possible modus operandi of
burglary); Smith v. State, 688 P.2d 326, 327 (Nev. 1984) (holding that expert testimony
explaining that some victims are ambivalent about the forcefulness with which they want to
pursue their complaints would assist the jury in understanding a victim's unusual behavior in
a sexual abuse case).
58 See Watson, 578 P.2d at 756 (holding that the competency and admissibility of opinion
testimony is discretionary, and that the jury instruction properly stated that the jury could
give whatever credibility it wished to the expert opinion).
19 See Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 708 P.2d 297, 300 (Nev. 1985) (holding that the trial court did
not err in admitting expert testimony regarding the cause of an automobile accident when the
conclusions contained in the testimony were based on a third party's accident report, photo-
graphs of the scene, witness' descriptions of the scene of the accident and the expert's famil-
iarity with the vehicle involved).
6 See, e.g., Wright v. Las Vegas Hacienda, 720 P.2d 696, 697 (Nev. 1986) (holding that
NEV. REV. STAT. 50.275 requires that an expert have special knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education to testify, but that a license is not required); Cheyenne v. Hozz, 720
P.2d 1224, 1226 (Nev. 1986) (holding that the lack of a license in the field of offered testi-
mony does not automatically preclude testimony, and that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by failing to qualify an unlicensed expert in light of other relevant factors).
61 See Freeman v. Davidson, 768 P.2d 885, 887 (Nev. 1989) (holding that an expert could
testify in a malpractice case although the witness was not a licensed physician until after the
date of the alleged malpractice); Wright, 720 P.2d at 697.
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a license, among other factors, in deciding to exclude testimony.62 In Porter v.
State,63 the court upheld the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony based
on the fact that the testimony was not within a recognized field of expertise. 64
In a later case, the court held that a police officer could not testify that based on
his law enforcement experience, the appearance of the defendant's injuries
indicated that he had recently been in a fight.65 The court held that only a
licensed medical expert would have been qualified to testify as to the cause of
injuries.66
Undoubtedly, the Nevada Supreme Court examines lower courts' deci-
sions very closely to determine whether such decisions have been made in
terms of reliability and trustworthiness. However, the court often provides lit-
tle or no analysis of the factors it considered in ruling on a trial court's deci-
sion. This lack of discussion by the Nevada Supreme Court, combined with the
possibility for vastly different interpretations of the terms reliability and trust-
worthiness, provide a great deal of gray area in which Nevada lawyers can
argue for the admission or exclusion of expert testimony. Still, the opportunity
for creative lawyering is at least somewhat offset by the need for predictability
and certainty in the law.
The Daubert decision and its subsequent Ninth Circuit interpretations
allow for a greater measure of certainty and predictability in federal courts than
is found in Nevada courts. Federal litigants know that the judge will thor-
oughly examine all proffered scientific evidence at the outset to determine
whether it will be admitted. Consequently, a federal plaintiff knows that any
scientific evidence must be based on good scientific grounds. On the other
hand, a Nevada state court will probably examine only the qualifications of the
witness in determining whether to admit testimony, and allow the often-unpre-
dictable jury to determine credibility. The predictability of the federal rule is
preferable to the uncertainty that exists in Nevada law today. Still, Nevada has
not yet followed the federal courts' lead.
IV. THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT AND DAUBERT
Since the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert, the Nevada
Supreme Court has referred to the opinion only three times, and has yet to
adopt it as the Nevada rule.67 In Nevada Employment Security Department v.
62 See Cheyenne, 720 P.2d at 1226.
63 See Porter v. State, 576 P.2d 275 (Nev. 1978).
6 See id. at 278-79 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
allow testimony regarding the general unreliability of eyewitness identification; the testi-
mony, by a psychologist formerly qualified as an expert in a Nevada District Court, was to
consist of a review of authored works concluding that eyewitness identification is
unreliable).
65 See Lord v. State, 806 P.2d 548, 551 (Nev. 1991) (holding that the trial court committed
harmless error in allowing a police officer to provide an opinion as to the cause of the
defendant's injuries, and that a medical opinion was needed instead).
66 See id.
67 See Nev. Employment Sec. Dept. v. Holmes, 914 P.2d 611 (Nev. 1996); Yamaha Motor
Co., U.S.A. v. Arnoult, 955 P.2d 661 (Nev. 1998); Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98
(Nev. 1998).
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Holmes, the Nevada Supreme Court overturned the trial court and reinstated an
administrative agency's denial of unemployment benefits. 68 The agency con-
sidered the results of a radio-immunoassay hair analysis (RIA) to prove cocaine
use, and determined that the employee's misconduct precluded benefits. 69 The
trial court reversed, holding that, "hair drug screens, standing alone, are scien-
tifically unreliable at this time to sufficiently form a legal basis for disqualify-
ing claimants."7° In reinstating the agency's decision, the Nevada Supreme
Court employed the reasoning of a federal district court, which held that RIA
testing was a scientifically acceptable method of drug testing.71 The federal
court examined expert testimony and scientific journals that validated RIA drug
testing and concluded that RIA testing had passed the Frye test; that it was
generally accepted by the scientific community as an accurate and reliable test
for measuring human cocaine use.72 The court considered the federal court's
holding and the testimony of two experts as to the test's reliability and con-
cluded that, "RIA testing ... is now an accepted and reliable scientific method-
ology for detecting illicit drug use."73
The opinion mentioned the trial court's decision that RIA testing was
unreliable to disqualify an employee from receiving unemployment benefits,
but did not find this argument persuasive.7 ' The court referred to the Daubert
opinion briefly, stating, "[w]e acknowledge that there are, arguably, no certain-
ties in science." 75 The opinion in Holmes provides more detailed analysis of
proposed scientific testimony than any other recent opinion. However, much of
the analysis was borrowed from a federal court.
Several years later, the Nevada Supreme Court addressed Daubert in
greater detail. In Yamaha Motor Co., U.S.A. v. Arnoult, the court upheld the
trial court's decision to admit the testimony of the plaintiffs expert witness as
to the inadequacy of warnings provided in the defendant's safety manual.76
The plaintiff sustained terrible injuries while driving a Yamaha four wheel
ATV that flipped over forward.7 7 She sued under strict liability and negli-
gence, and the jury returned a verdict in her favor, partly because defendant
failed to warn her of the danger of a forward flip in the vehicle's safety
manual.78
Yamaha appealed, arguing that the court should assume the "gatekeeping"
role described in Daubert to exclude the expert testimony of plaintiffs safety
engineer, Dr. Johnston, alleging that his testimony consisted of "unsupported
opinion testimony with no scientific basis."'79 The court declined to adopt
68 See Holmes, 914 P.2d at 614.
69 See id. at 613.
70 Id.
71 See id. at 614-15 (citing United States v. Medina, 749 F. Supp. 59, 60-62 (E.D.N.Y.
1990)).
72 See Medina, 749 F. Supp. at 60-61.
73 Holmes, 914 P.2d at 615.
74 See id.
75 Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
76 See Yamaha Motor Co., U.S.A. v. Arnoult, 955 P.2d 661 (Nev. 1998).
77 See id. at 664.
78 See id.
79 Id. at 667.
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Daubert in Yamaha, holding that its application is limited to evaluating the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence. 80 The court held that warnings
expertise is neither governed by the scientific method, nor does it implicate the
natural laws of science, but instead "falls within the area of 'specialized knowl-
edge' that may be the subject of expertise not totally governed by the scientific
method."8 ' Consequently, the court admitted Dr. Johnston's testimony based
solely on the quality of his credentials."2 The court in Yamaha seemed to
imply that it might have been ready to adopt Daubert, but not in a case where
the disputed testimony was of a technical nature, rather than purely scientific.
83
It would have been interesting to see the Nevada Supreme Court's ruling had
the Yamaha case been decided after the United States Supreme Court had
extended the Daubert rule to apply to technical and other specialized testimony
in Kumho Tire.s4
However, the court again declined to adopt the Daubert rule in a recent
silicon breast implant case.8 5 In Dow Chemical v. Mahlum, the court upheld a
judgment holding the manufacturer of silicon breast implants both negligent
and strictly liable for manufacturing unsafe and defective implants which
caused Mahlum's autoimmune disorder.8 6 The court held that "substantial evi-
dence" in the record supported the judgment rendered at trial.87 The evidence
on which the judgment was based was that of three expert witnesses. 8
The first witness was an immunologist, Dr. Gershwin, who is the author of
a number of articles about silicone and its negative effects on the human
immune system. 9 He examined the plaintiff and concluded, based on his stud-
ies and his examination of other women with silicon implants, that silicon had
damaged her brain and nerve sheaths, and had caused her to "suffer from a
multiple-sclerosis-like disease and a progressive dysfunction of the nerves." 90
Dr. Gershwin stated that all of these symptoms had been caused by Mahlum's
80 See id.
81 Id. at 667-68.
82 See id.
83 See id. Stating that:
"[g]atekeeping" under Daubert, requires the trial court to engage in a two-part analysis: (1) to
determine whether the evidence is based on "scientific knowledge"; and (2) whether the evi-
dence is relevant, i.e., that it will assist the trier of fact.... Daubert's applicability, however, is
still unclear .... To date, we have not adopted the Daubert test. We conclude that Daubert does
not apply to this case because, while some empirical behavioral testing may be involved in
assessing the efficacy of different warnings, warnings expertise does not, in its entirety, implicate
the natural "laws of science." . . . Here, the assessment of warnings falls within the area of
specialized knowledge that may be the subject of expertise not totally governed by the scientific
method.
Id.
84 See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (holding that, "[tihe
initial question before us is whether this basic gatekeeping obligation applies only to 'scien-
tific' testimony or to all expert testimony. We, like the parties, believe that it applies to all
expert testimony.").
85 See Dow Chem. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98 (Nev. 1998).
86 See id.
87 Id. at 107.




exposure to silicon, and such symptoms were common for women with silicon
implants. 9 '
Mahlum's other experts were her treating neurologist, Dr. Eaton, and a
rheumatologist, Dr. Atcheson, who had observed her symptoms but had appar-
ently not treated her. Dr. Eaton did not specifically testify that silicon had
caused Mahlum's illness, but stated that the majority of other women with
silicon implants that he had treated displayed similar nervous system disorders
and autoimmune diseases. 92 On the basis of his treatment of over one hundred
women with ruptured silicon implants, Dr. Atcheson concluded that Mahlum's
symptoms were caused in large part by exposure to silicon, which can cause
"atypical autoimmune disease."93
It seems likely that the Daubert/Kumho Tire rule may have compelled
different results in the Yamaha and Mahlum cases. The safety-engineering
expert in Yamaha did not explain how he arrived at his conclusions at all, 94
while the expert in Kumho Tire gave a very detailed explanation. 95 Nonethe-
less, the expert was certified to testify in Yamaha,96 while the testimony of the
tire expert in Kumho Tire was excluded. 97 The Nevada Supreme Court admit-
ted the testimony of Dr. Johnston based on his impressive academic and profes-
sional credentials, but the court did not examine the methodology or reasoning
he employed to reach his conclusions.98 Dr. Johnston had vast experience in
the safety field, but a federal court would have certainly forced him to validate
his conclusions. This process may take more time and limit the parties' right to
present the evidence of their choice, but it also insulates the court and the par-
ties from the prejudicial effect of unreliable testimony.
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, the court examined and admitted the
testimony of three experts.9 9 The testimony of the first expert, Dr. Gershwin,
would likely have been admitted in federal court as well. He is a classic
research scientist, whose studies are conducted in laboratories and published in
medical journals. He could undoubtedly explain to the court exactly how his
conclusions were reached, how they were tested and at what rate of error, and
show a number of journals in which they were subjected to peer review. While
not all of Dr. Gershwin's colleagues might agree with his conclusions, they
probably all use substantially similar methods when conducting experiments.
The admissibility of the testimony of the second expert, Dr. Eaton, would
have been a closer case in federal court. Dr. Eaton is a neurologist who treated
both the plaintiff and other women with silicon implants. " He testified that
most of the patients he saw with silicon breast implants complained of similar
symptoms, but he did not offer an opinion as to the source of these symp-
91 See id.
92 See id. at 108-09.
93 Id. at 109.
9' See Yamaha Motor Co., U.S.A. v. Arnoult, 955 P.2d 661, 667-68 (Nev. 1998).
95 See Kuhmo Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142-45 (1999).
96 See Yamaha, 955 P.2d at 667-68.
97 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 145.
98 See Yamaha, 955 P.2d at 667.
99 See Dow Chem. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 108-09 (Nev. 1998).
1oo See id.
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toms.' 0 1 Because Dr. Eaton's testimony was so narrow and contained observa-
tions rather than conclusions, the court would have also probably admitted his
testimony under Daubert. He had records to back up his opinions, and did not
jump to any unsupported conclusions based on his observations.
Dr. Atcheson, on the other hand, concluded that Mahlum's symptoms
were caused by an autoimmune disorder, which was caused by exposure to the
ruptured silicon implants. 10 2 He based this opinion on an examination of
Mahlum and on his prior treatment of over one hundred women with silicon
implants.1 0 3 While his conclusion is logical, it would most likely have failed
the Daubert test for admissibility. His conclusion had not been and cannot be
tested; therefore, no rate of error could have been established. His opinion had
not been subjected to publication or peer review nor was it generally accepted.
Dr. Atcheson's conclusion is nothing more than that of one doctor who was
justifiably concerned with the symptoms he had found in a majority of patients
with silicon breast implants. There are a number of studies that conclude that
silicon exposure is harmful, while many other studies disagree. 0 4 The Nevada
Supreme Court has decided that such disagreement did not matter, stating that
consensus was unnecessary, and that there was sufficient evidence to find
liability.10 5
Consensus in the scientific community is too stringent a standard to ask of
all expert evidence. It does not, however, seem unduly restrictive to ask courts
to ensure that experts are not only qualified, but also that they derived their
conclusions through sound methods. If the Nevada Supreme Court required an
examination of the methodology behind expert opinions and provided some
guidelines for trial courts to use in conducting such an examination, it would
insulate the jury from flawed science, while promoting consistency and predict-
ability in Nevada state courts.
101 See id.
102 See id. at 109.
103 See id.
"04 See Tom Corwin, In the Fight of Their Lives: Sisters of Silicone Battle Medical Estab-
lishment, THE AUGUSTA CHRONICLE ONLINE (July 9, 1997), at http://
www.augustachronicle.com/stories/o71097/fea-implant.html. Stating that:
In the medical realm, massive reviews of medical records by researchers at the Mayo Clinic and
Harvard University found no significant link between silicone and connective tissue diseases.
But the women claim those studies were influenced by funding from the breast-implant compa-
nies. They point to more recent studies, one by Tulane University and the other by a pathologist
at the University of Tennessee-Memphis, that show a link between disease and silicone.
Id.
105 See Dow Chem., 970 P.2d at 109. Holding that:
We are aware that causation is a scientifically controversial component of the plaintiffs case in
breast implant litigation. The Mahlums, however, did not need to wait until the scientific com-
munity developed a consensus that breast implants caused her diseases. . . . The Mahlums'
complaint was not tried in a court of scientific opinion, but before a jury of her peers who
considered the evidence and concluded that Dow Coming silicone gel breast implants caused her
injuries.
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V. THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF NEVADA DECISIONS
The Daubert rule puts more pressure on judges than its "general accept-
ance" predecessor. Many arguments against the Daubert rule exist, including:
the rule puts unnecessary and unfair pressure on judges who lack the scientific
training to make a preliminary ruling;' °6 the adoption of the Daubert rule in
Nevada would add needless and tedious motions to trial;1 °7 and the rule limits
the rights of litigants to have the case tried before a jury of their peers.' 8
The Daubert rule does in fact force judges into the difficult role of "gate-
keeper," in which they must decide which expert's methods are valid and
which are not. While most judges have limited scientific training, they must be
at least as qualified as the average jury, and the gatekeeper function insulates
the jury from opinion testimony with little or no objective scientific support.
The additional pre-trial motions that the Daubert rule requires are undoubtedly
cumbersome for federal practitioners. From a practical standpoint, Daubert
motions and hearings certainly take more time than the examinations conducted
under the more easily applied Frye standard. Also, the Daubert process likely
takes more time than the system used in Nevada state courts. However, it
seems more important to insulate lay-juries from bad science or bad conclu-
sions than it is to expedite trials. Many cases turn on the testimony of experts;
therefore, courts should do everything possible to ensure that expert testimony
is reliable and valid before admitting the evidence. In addition, the Daubert
rule does not prevent parties from litigating their disputes before a jury of their
peers. The rule simply encourages parties to more carefully select their experts
and construct their cases, and discourages professional expert witnesses from
offering a quickly formed, scientifically unsupportable opinion solely for the
purposes of testifying.
Federal judges applying the Daubert rule in the District of Nevada have
taken the gatekeeper role very seriously and conducted detailed analyses in
recent cases. 109 These decisions seem to apply the rule in precisely the way
that the United States Supreme Court intended. First, the court examines the
academic and professional qualifications of the expert.l"° Then, if the expert is
106 See Geoffery White, Admitting Scientific Evidence: Exploring the Ramifications of the
Nevada Supreme Court's Rejection of the Daubert Doctrine, NEV. LAW., May 1999, at 32.
Stating that:
The judge and his or her law clerk, most of whom have solid legal backgrounds but are not
versed in physics, science and medicine, read the motions, oppositions, and replies, and then
preside over lengthy and tedious inquisitions into the relative merits, or lack thereof, of each
expert's "methodology" in arriving at his or her conclusions. More often than not, when the
battle ends, most experts pass muster under Daubert.
Id.
'07 See id. ("Daubert motions can add needless complexity to an already complex trial,
often resulting in a trial judge having to try a complex medical product's liability case
twice.").
108 See id. ("The philosophy expressed by the Nevada Supreme Court in Mahlum was
decidedly in favor of a litigant's right to have his or her case decided by a jury of his or her
peers, and of allowing that jury broad access to expert testimony.").
109 See, e.g., Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 945 F. Supp. 209 (D. Nev. 1996); Valentine v. Pio-
neer Chlor Alkali Co., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 666 (D. Nev. 1996).
1I0 See Cabrera, 945 F. Supp. at 209; Valentine, 921 F. Supp. at 666.
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qualified, the judge analyzes the methodology used to derive the expert's con-
clusions."1  This analysis includes the four factors listed in Daubert,1 2 and
adds an additional factor created by the Ninth Circuit: "[w]hether the experts
are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of
research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they
have developed their opinions expressly for the purposes of testifying."' 13 A
comparison between these federal decisions and the previously discussed
Nevada Supreme Court decisions will show that qualified experts who attempt
to offer opinions based only on their own assurances of reliability can be
allowed to testify in Nevada state court, but are uniformly excluded in federal
court. Nevada state courts seem to consider qualifying the expert and examin-
ing the reliability of that expert's testimony as a one-step test. Federal judges,
on the other hand, first qualify the expert and then require that expert to support
his or her opinions or conclusions with valid science.
The following two cases show how the federal courts have used the
Daubert rule to thoroughly examine scientific methodology before admitting
the resulting conclusion. Also, this section will compare the federal courts'
decisions with the previously discussed Nevada cases, and will attempt to show
how the Nevada court might have more thoroughly and effectively examined
the offered expert testimony by using the Daubert analysis.
A. Cabrera v. Cordis Corp.
In Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., the federal court for the District of Nevada
examined the proposed testimony of five qualified expert witnesses in a prod-
ucts-liability case involving silicone brain shunts." 4 This case is similar to the
previously discussed Nevada Supreme Court case Dow Chemical Co. v.
Mahlum, in that both plaintiffs claimed that silicon exposure had led to the
development of an autoimmune disorder." 5 The federal court excluded one
expert's testimony as irrelevant without reaching a Daubert analysis and con-
ducted a fairly detailed analysis of the other expert testimony." 16
Dr. Vojdani, who holds a Ph.D. in immunology, offered to testify to the
results of a "silicone antibody blood test."" 7 The federal court excluded his
testimony, finding that because Dr. Vojdani had developed the test and was the
only person who ever used the test, he would have to establish its scientific
reliability before being allowed to offer testimony." 8 Dr. Vojdani was unable
III See Cabrera, 945 F. Supp. at 209; Valentine, 921 F. Supp. at 666.
112 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
13s Cabrera, 945 F. Supp. at 212 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d
1311, 1317 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995)).
114 See id. at 212-15.
115 See id. at 211; Dow Chem. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 106 (Nev. 1998).
116 See Cabrera, 945 F. Supp. at 213. Stating that:
Simply put, Puszkin looked at tissue through a microscope and observed a giant cell reaction to a
foreign body, which he could not identify at all, let alone as silicone. As such, Dr. Puszkin's
testimony is simply irrelevant under F.R.E. 401 and is not, in and of itself, helpful to the trier of
fact under F.R.E. 702.
Id.
17 Id. at 213.
118 See id.
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to offer any support for his methodology because all documentation regarding
its development had been destroyed, and the test had not been subjected to peer
review."' There is no generally accepted blood test for silicone antibodies,
and Dr. Vojdani did not study the chemical composition of the brain shunt
before conducting his test.1 20 In excluding the testimony, the federal court
concluded:
This Court is being asked to admit Dr. Vojdani's testimony based solely upon his
claim that the silicone antibody test he has developed is a valid scientific test.
Beyond the bald assertions of Dr. Vojdani, the Court has no basis for doing so and
concludes that the proffered testimony completely fails to meet the Daubert standard
for admissibility under F.R.E. 702.121
Under the current Nevada test, a Nevada state court seems likely to have
admitted Dr. Vojdani's testimony based solely on his immunology doctorate,
just as it admitted the testimony of Dr. Johnston in Yamaha Motor Co., U.S.A.
v. Arnoult based solely on his credentials.
1 22
The federal court then examined the testimony of Dr. Brautbar, an inter-
nist with a specialty in nephrology.123 Dr. Brautbar was advertised as an expert
for silicone breast implant plaintiffs.' 24 Based upon his neurological examina-
tion, he concluded that Cabrera's medical complaints were the result of silicone
toxicity. " His proposed testimony was very similar to that of Dr. Atcheson in
the Nevada Supreme Court case Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum. Both Dr.
Brautbar and Dr. Atcheson conducted examinations of the respective plaintiffs
and based their conclusions on the examinations of the plaintiffs' complained-
of symptoms, and on their experience with patients in similar situations.
1 26
Neither expert supported his conclusions with published tests or data. 127 None-
theless, Dr. Atcheson was allowed to testify in the Nevada state case while the
federal court excluded Dr. Brautbar's testimony.1
28
The federal court excluded the testimony of a physical chemist, Dr. Blais,
for the same reason as it did that of Dr. Brautbar: the offered testimony did not






122 See Yamaha Motor Co., U.S.A. v. Arnoult, 955 P.2d 661, 667-68 (Nev. 1998).
123 See Cabrera, 945 F. Supp. at 213.
124 See id.
125 See id.
126 See id.; Dow Chem. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 109 (Nev. 1998).
127 See Cabrera, 945 F. Supp. at 213; Dow Chem., 970 P.2d at 109.
128 See Cabrera, 945 F. Supp. at 213-14. Stating that:
In essence, Dr. Brautbar offers testimony that Cabrera's medical problems are silicone induced
because he says so. Clearly, Dr. Brautbar's theory cannot be viewed as having gained general
scientific acceptance in the relevant scientific community, nor is there any apparent way to test
the validity of his opinions .... Moreover, it appears that Cordis is correct that Dr. Brautbar has
developed his opinions expressly for purposes of testifying in this case and that he has not
himself performed any tests nor can he rely on other published tests or data regarding brain
shunts to substantiate his theories.
1d.; see Dow Chem., 970 P.2d at 109.
129 See Cabrera, 945 F. Supp. at 214.
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In examining the last expert, Dr. Veres, the court exercised considerable
discretion. Rather than make a pre-trial decision on whether to admit Dr.
Veres's testimony at a Daubert hearing, the court decided to consider different
parts of the testimony during trial. 130 This part of the decision shows the flexi-
bility that Daubert provides federal judges. The list of factors provided by the
U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit is non-exhaustive. Courts are not
required to use all of the factors if they do not apply, nor is any one factor
determinative. Also, as in this case, if the testimony consists of a variety of
conclusions or opinions, the court can rule on them on a case-by-case basis
during trial, rather than making a wholesale pre-trial ruling.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's evidentiary rulings in
Cabrera's appeal from summary judgment entered against her.' The Ninth
Circuit held that it was within the trial court's discretion to exclude the testi-
mony of Dr. Vojdani, who failed to provide information regarding his conclu-
sions, his testing measure, and whether he used the scientific method in his
research.1 32 It held that the exclusion of Dr. Brautbar's and Dr. Blais's testi-
mony was also within the trial court's discretion because Brautbar was unable
to show that he had followed the scientific method, while Dr. Blais had relied
on "underground knowledge, untested and unknown to the scientific
COmmUnity."'1
3 3
B. Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., Inc.
In Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., Inc., the federal district court
examined the testimony of four qualified expert witnesses who offered proof
that exposure to chlorine gas damaged plaintiffs' lungs, brains, and nervous
systems after the gas was accidentally released from defendant's facility.' 34
The court excluded the testimony of Dr. Heuser, a medical doctor who offered
the opinion that plaintiffs' symptoms were "what you typically see after chemi-
cal exposure," and that chlorine might have caused neurological damage
through oxygen deprivation, but admitted that his theories could probably not
be tested. 13
5
The court also excluded testimony from Dr. Spindell, who examined the
plaintiffs and concluded that they both "exhibited significant cognitive and
emotional deficits." 136 The court excluded Dr. Spindell's testimony because he
had not reviewed the plaintiffs' pre-accident cognitive or emotional capacities,
nor had he made an effort to find the cause of the alleged post-accident cogni-
tive and emotional deficits. 137 He made no attempt to rule out chlorine as the
cause of the deficits.' 38 He also failed to provide any research showing that
130 See id. at 215.
131 See Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 134 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1998).
132 See id. at 1422.
133 Id. at 1422-23.
134 See Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 666, 668 (D. Nev. 1996).
135 Id. at 671-72.




exposure to atmospheric chlorine could cause cognitive impairment. 139 The
court concluded that Dr. Spinell's testimony was based on speculation and con-
jecture, and excluded it under Daubert and FRE 702.140
Next, the court considered the testimony of Dr. Hirsch, who concluded
that plaintiffs suffered from headaches and had developed a hypersensitivity to
odors as a result of chlorine exposure. 141 Dr. Hirsch's testimony was initially
excluded because his conclusions were based entirely on examinations of the
plaintiffs. 142 He did not provide any medical literature supporting his conclu-
sions, nor had he published his conclusions in any recognized medical journal
or conducted any relevant pre-litigation research. 143 The court did not perma-
nently exclude Dr. Hirsch's testimony, but held that it would be admissible
only if Dr. Hirsch could
explain precisely how [he] reached [his] conclusions and point to some objective
source - a learned treatise, the policy statement of a professional organization, a
published article in a reputable scientific journal - to show that [he has] followed the
scientific method, as it is practiced by (at least) a recognized minority of scientists in
[his] field. 144
The proposed testimony of both Dr. Spindell and Dr. Hirsch in Valentine
is analogous to that of Dr. Brautbar in Cabrera and to that of Dr. Atcheson in
the Nevada Dow Chemical v. Mahlum case. All four doctors offered conclu-
sions regarding the cause of the respective plaintiffs' symptoms based solely on
their physical examinations. 145 None of them supported their opinions with
any relevant medical research, nor did they publish their conclusions or conduct
relevant research prior to trial. 146 Despite the similarity of each expert's
offered testimony, only Dr. Atcheson was allowed to testify. 147 The Nevada
Supreme Court determined that he was a qualified medical doctor, and then
allowed him to offer his conclusions based solely on his experience and qualifi-
cations, despite the fact that he offered no objective support for his
conclusions. 1
4 8
Finally, the court in Valentine conducted an extremely detailed analysis of
the methodology used by Dr. Kilburn. 14 9 Dr. Kilburn is board certified in
internal medicine, preventive medicine, and occupational health.1 50 He con-
ducted various tests and concluded that one plaintiff had suffered nerve damage
as a result of exposure to chlorine gas.' 5 ' Again, as with the other experts in
139 See id.
'40 See id.
141 See id. at 672-73.
142 See id.
141 See id. at 673.
144 Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995)(citing United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 924 (9th Cir. 1994))).
141 See Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 945 F. Supp. 209, 213-14 (D. Nev. 1996); Valentine, 921
F. Supp. at 671-73.
14 See Cabrera, 945 F. Supp. at 213; Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 109 (Nev.
1998); Valentine, 921 F. Supp. at 672-73.
141 See Dow Chem., 970 P.2d at 109.
148 See id.
149 See Valentine, 921 F. Supp. at 673-78.
50 See id. at 673.
151 See id.
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the case, Dr. Kilbum did not base his opinions on any independent medical
research.'52 However, Dr. Kilbum previously published an article related to
the causation issue."' The publication of this article seems to meet several of
the factors considered to be important in both the Supreme Court's Daubert
decision and the Ninth Circuit's decision issued on remand. Namely, Dr. Kil-
bum subjected his theory to peer review and developed it prior to and indepen-
dent from the litigation. However, the court in Valentine did not find these
factors persuasive and excluded Dr. Kilburn's testimony.15 4
The court excluded Dr. Kilburn's testimony in part because his published
article had not been subjected to "true" peer review, but instead had only been
subjected to "editorial" peer review. 55 Since the peer review was not satisfac-
tory, the court was obligated to ensure that the scientific methods used in Dr.
Kilburn's investigation were "grounded in good science."' 5 6 The court found
Dr. Kilburn's methodology to be flawed and inadmissible.' 5 7
While the court in Valentine may have taken the Daubert analysis to an
extreme, it does not mean that every court is required to go to such detail.
Daubert is a flexible test. Its factors can be considered and weighed by judges
using far less scientific expertise than the judge in Valentine. Less qualified
judges will learn to evaluate expert evidence as they decide the complex cases
on their docket.
Valentine and Cabrera are examples of how the Daubert test could have
been applied by Nevada courts in similar recent cases. Had the Nevada
Supreme Court applied the Daubert analysis in Dow Chemical v. Mahlum and
Yamaha Motor Co., U.S.A. v. Arnoult, it probably would have admitted the
152 See id. at 674.
153 See id. Noting that:
Plaintiffs vaunt the fact of publication in 1995 of the article by Dr. Kilburn in the International
Journal of Occupational Medicine and Toxicology entitled "Evidence that Inhaled Chlorine is
Neurotoxic and Causes Airway Obstruction." The article purports to find an association between
the exposure of seven individuals to chlorine and their subsequent presentation with various
symptomatic neuropathologies.
Id.
154 See id. at 678.
155 See id. at 674-75. The court determined that true peer review involves an investigator
making "her methods and findings public, so that others can attack or support her conclusion
by following the same protocols while asking what besides the stated principle could account
for the documented results." Id. On the other hand, editorial peer review is conducted not
by the scientific community at large, but rather by a journal referee, who merely reviews the
article and makes "confidential comments on the article's scientific accuracy, style, original-
ity and importance," and then recommends that the article be published or rejected. Id.
156 Id. at 675.
157 See id. at 678. Holding that:
In summary, Dr. Kilbum's study suffers from very serious flaws. He took no steps to eliminate
selection bias in the study group, he failed to identify the background rate for the observed
disorders in the Henderson community, he failed to control for potential recall bias, he simply
ignored the lack of reliable dosage data, he chose a tiny sample size, and he did not attempt to
eliminate so-called confounding factors which might have been responsible for the incidence of
neurological disorders in the subject group. As a result, his conclusions that the plaintiffs' expo-
sure to atmospheric chlorine caused their neurological disorders cannot be said to be derived
from acceptable scientific methodology.
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testimony of fewer witnesses than it did using the current Nevada test. At the
very least, the parties would have had to meet a much higher standard of relia-
bility before the court would admit their offered evidence. Also, the resulting
opinions would have contained more detailed analyses and would have had
more precedential value. Over time, the Daubert test would provide a greater
degree of predictability and certainty for the parties, and would make litigants
less likely to engage in forum shopping between state and federal court, look-
ing to ensure that questionable evidence be admitted or excluded.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Nevada Supreme Court should adopt the Daubert rule or create a
similar test. The current Nevada rule only considers the qualifications of the
expert and fails to examine the scientific methodology behind the expert's con-
clusions. This rule allows experts to offer unreliable opinions that have never
been considered by the scientific community, and does not require these experts
to offer any independent research or objective data to support their conclusions.
Under the current rule, it is difficult for Nevada practitioners to predict which
factors the court will consider when deciding whether to admit expert
testimony.
It is clear that Nevada is now more liberal in its approach to expert evi-
dence than the federal courts. The results of recent cases compel parties with
shaky experts to try their cases in state court, while parties wishing to exclude
evidence will likely seek the federal forum.
Adoption of the Daubert rule would eliminate the need for forum shop-
ping and provide decisions with clearer analysis and greater precedential value.
Daubert puts judges in the difficult position of judging which expert testimony
is valid and which is not. However, this approach is preferable to putting juries
in the same position. Judges would quickly gain competency as they tried com-
plex cases under the new rule, and Nevada's lawyers and citizens would benefit
as a result.
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